Time to Steady the Pendulum
The author questions whether the ever-increasing emphasis on standards is diametrically opposed to principles
of the United Nations and the International Mine Action Standards1,2 and whether the implementation of the
IMAS restricts a humanitarian response.
by Eddie Banks [ The “Ca’d’oro” ]

T

he global need to respond to the
social, economic and humanitarian
impact of anti-personnel landmines
will soon enter its third decade. From one
perspective, the expansion and maturity of
the global mine-action programme appears
dramatic and positive; yet from another, it
may appear quite the opposite. Emergency
mine action, designed to alleviate suffering
and improve socioeconomic situations, is a
critical post-conflict response. International
and national responses, however, should also
be aimed at addressing short- and long-term
objectives, maximising utilisation of limited
finances and implementing efforts quickly.
Mine-action programmes concentrated
initially on rapid response rather than on
standards. This trend started to change in the
early 1990’s with an emphasis on safety and
quality standards. It was often accompanied
by a resistance to addressing productivity (and
therefore not actively addressing effectiveness, efficiency or delivery in a timely manner2). In 1997 the standards pendulum was
initiated with the production of International
Standards for Mine Clearance Operations;3
this initial work was incorporated in 2001 into
the International Mine Action Standards.
With the continuing development of the
IMAS, the standards pendulum began to swing
even farther to the right, concentrating solely
on standards that emphasise and implement a
quality and a safety regime. While the IMAS
provide a very sound foundation for clearance
activities, the continued development of an
International Standards Organization-based
system could be in danger of losing sight of the
humanitarian perspective. Indeed, standards
are now so important that they override the
need to work effectively, efficiently and in a
timely manner.
Differing Views
We all view mine action from slightly different angles, though all are presently bound, in
more ways than one, by the IMAS and the associated plethora of supporting documentation.
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company? The price is too high if it is an exercise in obtaining some
sort of accreditation without real benefits. The question is: Are the
revised standards now prolonging the socioeconomic and environmental impact caused by mines and unexploded ordnance and creating long-term dependency? Mine action should not be learning about
living with mines but about working toward a future without mines.
The Critical Issues
Even if donors provide contributions quickly, there are a number of
issues in the context of the IMAS that need to be addressed in order to
utilise donations effectively. These include:
• Defining effective, efficient and delivered in a timely manner
• Acceptance of the productivity issue
• Creating a balanced response
• Interpreting the standards and guidelines in a pragmatic and
flexible manner
• Modifying the IMAS to take a more humanitarian perspective
Effective, efficient and timely. The United Nations, by the utilisation of the IMAS, has attempted to create a safety and quality foundation that should provide the tools for programmes and projects to assure
they are conducted effectively and efficiently and are able to be delivered
promptly. However, if by the use of the IMAS, humanitarian-demining
costs increase or they slow the humanitarian-demining process, then the
IMAS could only be identified as ineffective and inefficient. Operating
efficiently does not necessarily mean effectively, and being effective does
not automatically mean operating efficiently. Delivered in a timely manner is a meaningless phrase;
it is too general and cannot
be measured.
The IMAS are about
standards that can be
measured, so productivity
data (operational speeds)
as guidelines for outputs
provide something that
is measurable. The IMAS
should be a guideline to
monitor quality control on-site, or a basis for assessing site work (by
use of daily reports) when no on-site inspectors are available. Maybe
the statement should be something with more meaning, such as
“operating to defined safety and quality standards and to known productivity outputs.”
The productivity issue. The three key elements of most contracts are:
1. Performance completed to a certain standard (safety and quality)
2. Work conducted within an agreed budget or contract cost
3. Execution of the task within the contractual time
The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre spent months
assessing a productivity table, taking into account the variety of factors
that affect productivity. While this process may not be considered perfect, BHMAC at least accepted that productivity was a critical issue.
Commercial companies, regardless of their function, have to address
productivity on every task to conduct project management and workactivity tables, and to plot daily progress. The IMAS make no reference
to work productivity or any phrase closely associated with it, so how do
the United Nations and the authors of the IMAS determine that a task
has been achieved in a timely manner?
The emphasis on safety and quality alone has resulted in an environment where actual work output is reduced to a nonessential item.
This situation results only in increasing longevity and costs. Standards
and guidelines cannot address all on-site situations; therefore, common
sense, guided by the standards and guidelines, and site-specific risk
assessments, are essential requirements.

The inclusion of risk assessment4 in a 2006 study by the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining is one of the most
progressive and lateral-thinking concepts to come from the establishment for some time—but beware of the dragon. Risk assessment needs
a complete understanding of the site and technological limitations.
Undertaken correctly, risk assessment can reduce time and effort, and
therefore costs, but assessments undertaken in the uncertainty of an
operational site can sometimes go wrong. In mine and unexploded
ordnance contracts, the penalty for being wrong may be treated with
undue harshness.
Balanced response. A balanced response should maintain the
equilibrium among mine-risk education, mine-victim assistance,
information technology, training, research and development, and
mine and UXO clearance. The IMAS presently control all of these to
some degree.
Few will argue against the need for standards, but some may
argue that the present interpretation of the IMAS by many makes the
standards far too restrictive. For example, a newly formed NGO is
measured at the same level (standards) as an international NGO or seasoned commercial company. The current IMAS do not allow for these
variations in capability (standards) and therefore limit the chances of
newly emerging, indigenous organisations—the very ones we should
be encouraging.
Modifying the IMAS to take a more humanitarian perspective. Most of the land on which work has been undertaken before the
IMAS were established has been accepted as cleared and returned to
its owners, so former
standards of work must
have achieved an acceptable standard of output.
Standards,
moreover,
must address real needs,
so unless the IMAS can
provide an effective QA/
QC framework, they have
failed.
While other industries, none of which have a major humanitarian element, demand
error-free standards, the depletion of donor funds from a decreasing
humanitarian budget makes unrealistic standards hard to justify from
a humanitarian perspective. Standards need to be tailored to meet three
basic requirements in present-day mine action:
1. Humanitarian: Humanitarian standards must exist to achieve
safety, quality and productivity but must not curtail—by time,
effort or cost restrictions—the humanitarian response.
2. Commercial: Commercial standards should be based on the
same format and basic principles as humanitarian standards,
but the commercial clients must be able to select additional
work standards to achieve a level of confidence for which they
are willing to pay. In many cases, IMAS rules and regulations
meet this requirement.
3. Health, safety and environmental: Finally, there are those companies that seek an even higher level of confidence based on
stringent HSE requirements. This standard may mean not using
mechanical equipment if they think that it could cause environmental damage to delicate soil layers or flora and fauna—not
something normally considered on humanitarian mine-action
sites.
In their present form, the IMAS fall somewhere between humanitarian and commercial requirements. Serious thought needs to be given
to the development of a tiered system or to amending the text to allow a
selection process based on project needs.

“ Standards are necessary for any
mine-action activity, but standards
must reflect actual need.”

The IMAS Web site is managed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining on behalf of the United
Nations Mine Action Service, and hosted and maintained by the Mine Action Information Center.
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The close coordination of a multitude
of players is a difficult task. Donor organisations, however, have spent more than 10
years addressing policy, standards, advocacy
and the fundraising role so that implementing organisations (both nongovernmental and
commercial) can provide (if rules and regulations permit) operations that function efficiently. If the rules, regulations or external
factors restrict the implementing organisations, then efficient, effective and timely objectives become difficult—if not impossible—to
achieve.
IMAS—The Good, the Bad and the Ugly
Since 1997, the concept of operating an
ISO-styled system has become popular and
the momentum to instigate an ever-increasing
standards regime has been clearly identifiable.
While many argued for standards that address
humanitarian needs and complained of the
increased costs and donation depletion, the

need for comprehensive standards is undeniable. Yet, while comprehensive standards
have raised standards of quality, it has become
obvious that the IMAS have developed lives of
their own, raising the question of whether this
is an acceptable cost.
While the IMAS are not actually ISObased, the two are now so close together that
they are seen as one. Several mine-action centres and individual nongovernmental organisations are now preparing to become ISO
certified due to the pressure to be ahead of the
game. Few may understand the time, effort
and cost needed to comply and maintain an
ISO-styled capability. It is difficult enough
for large commercial companies and international NGOs to fully comply; it would be
impossible for most small companies, almost
all of them indigenous organisations.
If a company is already operating under
International Mine Action Standards, then
what does ISO accreditation do for the
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The Financial Implications
Standards cost money. They are expensive
to write and maintain; they cost considerably
more to implement. Little information has
been provided since the initial writing of the
IMAS about their real costs. Certainly there
are some commercial contracts for which the
cost of IMAS implementation is significantly
higher than for other contracts. 5
As standards become increasingly stringent, there will be a correspondingly greater
cost to implement those standards. While
commercial clients may be able to bear this
additional cost, the financial cost for humanitarian work can reduce a donation’s effectiveness. Real cost in this situation is measured in
prolonging socioeconomic hardship through
additional injuries and deaths, and in further
delays in improving conditions for those we
are supposed to assist.

Summary
Standards are necessary for any mineaction activity, but standards must ref lect
actual need. The authors of the IMAS must
also balance humanitarian with commercial needs, and they must ensure that this
intention is not subject to different interpretations. Currently, evidence suggests a
widespread lack of understanding on how to
interpret the IMAS—this could point to failure of the standards.
As less money is available, standards could
be blamed for prolonging the period that many
communities have to coexist with mines. If
this is the case, then maybe standards will be
responsible for making the term humanitarian
mine action an oxymoron. It is time to carry
out mine action in a more (cost) effective, efficient and timely manner.
See Endnotes, page 110
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Mine Ban Enters into Force in Jordan
Following a royal decree, the 2008 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban became an official part of Jordanian law.
The Kingdom of Jordan, which signed the Ottawa Convention banning the use of landmines in 1998,
has been working to eradicate landmines and other explosive remnants of war since that time. The
new law represents a deepening of the government’s commitment to addressing the landmine problem
in the kingdom.
States Parties to the Ottawa Convention are obliged to make consistent progress toward eliminating
the threat posed by landmines, and Jordan has been pursuing this goal since signing the Convention.
The government of Jordan created the National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation in 2000
to direct policy for and supervise mine-action activities. The NCDR is chaired by HRH Prince Mired
and directs management and regulatory activities, as well as coordinating mine-action programs and
supervising the implementation of best policies and procedures.
The 2008 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban now provides national legal punishments for anyone emplacing
AP mines in Jordan as well as anyone trading, developing, possessing or handling mines in other
ways. There are also punishments for anyone aiding or abetting any of these prohibited actions.
Exceptions to these regulations are provided to approved government parties actively involved in
landmine eradication—most notable are members of the Jordanian Armed Forces who use mines in explosive ordnance disposal training exercises.
Those found guilty of violating the statutes of the new law are subject to steep fines, imprisonment
and hard labor. Additionally, anyone who provides information to authorities on illegal activities
can receive legal protection for his/her assistance.
The new law also establishes the NCDR as the lead mine-action coordinating and supervising agency
in the country. The NCDR is now officially responsible for working with the armed forces and outside
agencies to ensure successful collaboration. The 2008 AP Mine Ban also gives the NCDR the authority
to make requests of international organizations for information as well as assistance with equipment and training.
Although it has made remarkable progress in addressing the landmine situation within and along its
borders, Jordan anticipates that its original deadline for landmine clearance by May 2009, as dictated by the Convention, may need to be extended to 2011.
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T

he Biblical parable of the two sons1
illustrates a great human dilemma
often repeated in literature and life.
It is a very simple story: One son responds to
his father’s request to work in the vineyard
by declining, yet reconsiders his intention
and in the end does his father’s bidding. The
other son, keen to appear obedient, accepts
the responsibility, but decides against doing
the work. The question of who has done the
father’s will answers itself.
This parable reminds me of the state of the
Ottawa Convention. 2 Four years ago in this
column, I commented about the undoubted
success and shortcomings of the Anti-personnel
Mine Ban Convention.3 Those observations
are, I believe, still true. The more timely issue,
however, is implied by the very nature of the
Convention itself. Is the Convention providing
guidance that induces practitioners to do
good, or does it provide a forum where officials
simply make meaningless conversation and so
become a clanging cymbal?4
Let us review how the “sons,” who said that
they were going to uphold the Convention, are
doing. There is at least one signatory, Venezuela,
still making active use of its emplaced antipersonnel landmines, even while making statements at meetings that it is fully committed to
the Convention. To my knowledge, no State
Party has questioned Venezuela’s noncompliant behavior, leaving only the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines to condemn the
action, calling it “highly disturbing.”5
Regarding mines retained for training
(Article 3), the Landmine Monitor reports that
“there is a clear history of little or no consumption [destruction] of retained mines by a significant number of States Parties.”6 Eighteen
countries have not reported destroying any
landmines since ratifying the Convention,
while 15 more of those with remaining stockpiles have not reported destroying APLs for
two or more years.6
Clearance is the focal point of mine
action; the Convention requires that 10 years
after accession, mine clearance must be complete. At the meetings of the States Parties in
Amman, Jordan, in November 2007, heavy
emphasis was put on this requirement. Yet,
it appears that at least 14 states will not
meet their 2009 deadlines, with four failing to commence clearance operations at
all.6 Indeed most of the discussion during
the clearance portion of the meeting dealt
with procedures for requesting extensions for
clearance operations.

In spite of the overwhelming good being
accomplished by the Ottawa Convention
ban on anti-personnel landmines, there are
indications that actual accomplishments and
adherence to its tenets are sometimes ignored
in favor of rhetoric. Worse is the tendency of
other signatories to turn a blind eye to these
shortfalls, not wishing to be accused of being
negative toward fellow States Parties.
The “other sons” (in this case, nonsignatories) have acted variously. Countries
that decided not to ban APLs via the Ottawa
Convention are not intrinsically evil. They
felt that they had a larger responsibility in
defending their allies (e.g., the United States),
believed chronic border problems necessitated
APL reliance (e.g., Finland), or they placed a
greater emphasis and reliability on more traditional arms-control venues (e.g., India).
It may surprise some to learn that the
United States has adhered to the spirit of the
Ottawa Convention since it was signed by the
first States Parties and whose last significant
use of APLs took place in the 1991 Gulf War
in order to defend Saudi Arabia, the same year
of the entry into force of the Convention. The
United States also has, beginning in 1988,
developed an extensive program of humanitarian mine-action programs, exercised leadership of the Mine Action Support Group,
managed a robust mine-detection and clearance research and development program,
and has destroyed well over 3.3 million of its
stockpiled landmines.7
Most of the 30 nonsignatories have
endorsed the concept of elimination of
APLs and 19 attended the Eighth Meeting
of States Parties in Jordan. Most have also
endorsed nontransfer or moratorium actions.
Many countries that are not parties to the
Convention have been taking steps toward it,
such as cessation of production and export.
If one were to assess the use of APLs today,
it is generally not states who are the culprits,
but factions, insurgents, drug lords, criminals
and terrorists.
A review of national mine action globally reveals some interesting, if predictable,
conclusions. Since the early 1990s, virtually
every government and country has come to
understand the insidious nature of APLs.
Some countries could quickly sign the Ottawa
Convention because they had no landmines,
were not disposed to use landmines, or were so
impressed by the need to ban landmines that
they decided to override whatever military
necessity APLs rendered—or perhaps they

signed because the political climate provided
them an altruistic persona.
The difference between these two sets of
countries—signatories and nonsignatories—
has been overblown; Finland and Norway,
the United States and Canada, and Turkey
and India are more alike in this regard than
they are different. All but the most roguish of
states desire to see the end of indiscriminate
APL use. The time has come for the global
mine-action community to accept all who
wish to see the humanitarian impact of landmines—as well as other explosive remnants of
war—eliminated. 8 The efforts that go into universalization and the finger-pointing it often
engenders not only sap the energy and unity
that could be focused on clearing landmines
and ERW, but worse, that creates holier-thanthou attitude that leads to words rather than
actions, recriminations rather than results,
and isolation rather than inclusion.
See Endnotes, page 110
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